The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet by Fontana, David
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
9-1-2004
The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic
Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to
Professor Tushnet
David Fontana
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Fontana, The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 445 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol38/iss1/8
THE NEXT GENERATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL/DOMESTIC
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR TUSHNET
David Fontana*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
A. A Transnational Law Constitutional Moment?
B. Transnational Law in Constitutional Interpretation




* J.D. expected, Yale University; D.Phil. expected, Oxford University; B.A.,
University of Virginia. My thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Stephen Galoob,
Paul Horwitz, A.E. Dick Howard, Vicki C. Jackson, Paul Kahn, Vasan
Kesavan, Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Nickolai Levin, Matthew Lindsay, Gerard
Magliocca, Jeffrey Manns, Jerry Mashaw, Judith Resnik, John Rich, Louis
Michael Seidman, Kate Stith, Mark Tushnet, and Howard Wasserman for
helpful comments and discussions on this and related issues. The author also
thanks the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for giving me the
opportunity to write this Reply. I expand in greater detail on some of my
arguments in this piece in two other places: David Fontana, Refined
Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 539 (2001), and in a
work in progress tentatively entitled Refined Comparativism Five Years Later.
It should be noted that the writing of this piece was mostly completed in the
Fall of 2004.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mark Tushnet is one of the new breed of American public law
scholars. He has written widely and notably on a range of American
domestic law subjects, from the civil rights movement' to
constitutional theory.2 He has also written on a range of topics
related to comparative constitutional law,3 and he has consistently
integrated what he has learned 4 from writing about other countries
into his writings on the American constitutional condition.
5
1. E.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATION, 1925-1950 (1987); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1987).
2. E.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
3. E.g., VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1999); Mark V. Tushnet,
Alternate Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2781 (2003); Mark V.
Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L. J.
11 (2000); Mark V. Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some
Cautionary Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649
(2004) [hereinafter Tushnet, Cautionary Notes]; Mark V. Tushnet, Marbury v.
Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251 (2004); Mark V. Tushnet,
Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1895
(2004); Mark V. Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial
Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435 (2002); Mark V.
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L. J.
1225 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Possibilities].
4. See generally Tushnet, Cautionary Notes, supra note 3 (identifying
reasons for caution about the use of transnational law in interpreting domestic
constitutions); Tushnet, Possibilities, supra note 3 (analyzing three distinct
ways that comparing the constitutional experiences of other nations may assist
with our interpretations of the U.S. Constitution). Tushnet is not the only
major contemporary scholar who uses this "integrated" approach to
scholarship, fusing the domestic and the foreign. His colleague Vicki C.
Jackson is another example of someone who writes "integrated" scholarship.
For examples of her writings on domestic subjects, see, for instance, Vicki C.
Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and Structural Reasoning, 2001 SUP.
CT. REV. 229; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson,
Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Baker and Our Bifurcated Constitution,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1259 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 495 (1997). For examples of her writings using the integrated approach,
see, for instance, JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 3; Vicki C. Jackson,
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the
Conversation on "Proportionality, " Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 583 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity:
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Perhaps because he has so seamlessly integrated the
transnational and domestic, Professor Tushnet understates many of
the serious objections to this integrative approach in his essay,
Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law. At the same time,
while Professor Tushnet understates many of the legitimate
objections to integrating transnational law into our law, these
States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15
(2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Gender and Transnational Legal Discourse, 14
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377 (2002); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation,
Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
265 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223 (2001); Vicki C.
Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the US. Court:
Gender Equality, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 271 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Yes
Please, I'd Love to Talk With You, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2004, at 43
[hereinafter Jackson, Yes Please].
Bruce Ackerman is another example of a scholar who uses this
integrated approach. He has written many notable pieces on domestic
constitutional law. E.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
Ackerman has also written on comparative and international matters, most
recently in the context of the lessons we may gleam from the experiences of
other countries with states of emergency. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029-62 (2004) (looking to the experiences of
Canada, Germany, India, Poland, Rome, Russia, and South Africa regarding
states of emergency).
5. Indeed, we may wonder whether this "new breed" of integrated scholars
are simply picking up where scholars generations ago left off, but where their
successors failed to follow. For instance, consider that Roscoe Pound was a
prolific scholar of comparative law. The first year that he taught law, at the
University of Nebraska in 1899, Pound taught Roman Law, Comparative Law,
and History of English Law. See PAUL SAYRE, THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND
143 (1948). Four years later, Pound was writing that jurisprudence "might be
called: the comparative anatomy of developed systems of law." 1 ROSCOE
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, at iv (1959). In the 1950s, Pound was the president
of the Acadamie Internationale de Droit Compar6. His landmark book on
jurisprudence focused substantially on foreign law. Roscoe Pound,
Comparative Law in the Formation ofAmerican Common Law, in 1 ACTORUM
ACADEMIAE UNIVERSIALIS IURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAE 183, 197
(Elmer Balogh ed. 1928); see also Roscoe Pound, The Place of Comparative
Law in the American Law School Curriculum, 8 TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (1934)
(discussing how to integrate comparative law studies into the law school
curriculum). See generally David Fontana, The Pervasive Method in
American Law Schools, Law Finns and Law Courts (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (arguing for a revitalization of Pound's approach).
6. See Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 239 (2003).
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objections should not be considered fatal to the "integrative
approach" (integrating domestic and transnational7 constitutional
law). The best approach, as this Reply will briefly discuss, is to
consider the arguments against the integrative approach neither to be
superfluous, nor determinative. Rather, the new generation of
integrative scholarship should recognize that these criticisms have
their merits, but also that integrative activities are here to stay. We
need to move beyond "all or nothing" scholarship on this topic and
find a way to create a principled system of integrative activities.
Consequently, the best way forward is to begin considering how to
create a world where the domestic and foreign are integrated, but
integrated in the optimal manner.
This Reply discusses this potential new generation of integrative
scholarship in the context of the two areas that Professor Tushnet
discusses: Transnational law as merely persuasive authority that
courts may choose to follow when they engage in constitutional
interpretation, and transnational law as binding authority that
American courts8 must follow.9 In his discussion of transnational law
as persuasive authority, Professor Tushnet overstates the importance
of the current moment, but understates the serious concerns that
many may have with using transnational law as persuasive authority
and the distinctiveness of these concerns from general debates about
constitutional interpretation. 10 In his discussion of transnational law
as binding authority, Professor Tushnet too easily dismisses the valid
federalism and sovereignty concerns that integration skeptics have
presented. 1
7. For the purposes of this Reply, "transnational law" refers to
comparative law (i.e. the domestic law of foreign countries) and international
law (the law among nation-states).
8. Tushnet has been one of the leading pioneers of studying the
Constitution outside of the courts. E.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003). Given that fact, it is curious that he does not
examine transnational law outside of the courts, and whether the arguments he
makes are solely limited to the intersection of the domestic and the
transnational in the courts.
9. This Reply discusses these two areas in the contexts of the arguments
that Tushnet makes, but also extends slightly beyond Tushnet's arguments to
address some general issues raised by these two areas of integrative activity.
10. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 239-46.
11. Id.
Fall 2004] TRANSNAT'L/DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 449
II. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
Tushnet first discusses the role of transnational law as
persuasive authority.' 2 Persuasive authority is authority that courts
need not follow, but may consult if they feel it will be helpful.' 3 As
Patrick Glenn defined it, persuasive authority is "authority which
attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it.' 14 Tushnet focuses on
the use of transnational law as persuasive authority by focusing on
"recent references in U.S. Supreme Court opinions to constitutional
developments in other jurisdictions, and the critiques of those
references from within the Court."' 5  Tushnet makes two central
claims about the role of transnational law as persuasive authority.
First, Tushnet seems to argue' 6 that the developments of the past
several years mark some sort of "transnational constitutional
moment,"' 7 bringing the idea of transnational law as persuasive
12. Id. at 241.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (8th ed. 1999).
14. H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263
(1987). For my earlier discussion of persuasive authority in the context of
transnational law, see David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 557-59 (2001).
15. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 240.
16. Tushnet's argument about the use of transnational law as persuasive
authority is a little less stark and explicit than his argument about the use of
transnational law as binding authority, but his piece does include some text that
makes this seem like a particularly important moment for transnational law as
persuasive authority. See id. at 241 ("Prior to Lawrence v. Texas, no recent
Supreme Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or para-
constitutional law to support a proposition that was material to the majority's
analysis." (footnote omitted)); id. at 244 ("The current Court's first use of non-
U.S. law to support a position relevant to its disposition came in Lawrence v.
Texas .... ."); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III., The Use of International Law in
Judicial Decisions, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 423, 424 (2004) ("As
Professor Mark Tushnet has recognized, never before in our history has the
Court relied so directly on foreign precedents to support a position material to
the Court's holding." (citing Tushnet, supra, note 6)). But see Tushnet, supra
note 6, at 245 ("It is important not to exaggerate the degree of controversy
manifested on the Supreme Court.").
17. This phrase is obviously a reformulation of Bruce Ackerman's
discussion of "constitutional moments," or moments when there were
significant changes in the domestic constitutional order. 1 ACKERMAN, supra
note 4, passim; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 4, passim. It is also a reformulation
of Anne-Marie Slaughter's use of the phrase "international constitutional
moment[s]" to describe moments when there are major changes in the
international constitutional regime. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-
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authority to the center of public and scholarly attention for the first
time. Second, Tushnet argues that this debate about the integrative
approach is not really about transnational law, but is instead about
larger questions of constitutional interpretation, with the appropriate
role of transnational law simply being the particular application of
these larger debates.
A. A Transnational Law Constitutional Moment?
Tushnet seems to argue' 9 that this is a major moment for the use
of transnational law as persuasive authority. In Lawrence v. Texas,
20
decided two years ago, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote an opinion
for the Court invalidating a Texas law criminalizing same-sex
sodomy law as violating substantive due process.' Justice
Kennedy's opinion cited to earlier European statements on
homosexuality to disprove a statement in an earlier Supreme Court
opinion that condemnation of homosexual conduct was universal.22
Justice Kennedy also discussed transnational law as a means of
assessing the gravity of the liberty interest involved, and of
determining whether the statute at issue furthered any permissible
state goals. 23 Tushnet argues that "[p]rior to Lawrence v. Texas, no
recent Supreme Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or
para-constitutional law to support a proposition that was material to
the majority's analysis"24 and later asserts that "[t]he current Court's
first use of non-U.S. law to support a position relevant to its
disposition came in Lawrence v. Texas. 25
White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2
(2002).
18. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241.
19. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
20. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
21. Id. at 578.
22. Id. at 571 (citing to Chief Justice Burger's statement in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating
to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the
history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards").
23. Id. at 577 ("The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted
as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.").
24. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241.
25. Id. at 244.
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In many ways, Tushnet is right to note how important Lawrence
was for transnational law. Lawrence involved constitutional
questions surrounding a politically controversial issue,
homosexuality, so it was sure to gain attention, thereby ensuring that
its discussion of transnational law was also sure to gain much
attention. The Court also issued the Lawrence opinion on the last
day that the Court was releasing opinions from its 2002 Term,26 so a
great amount of public attention was already focused on the Court.
Coupled with the use of transnational law in Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger27 -- another case
involving politically controversial issues and issued during the last
week of the 2002 Term28 -perhaps the Court was self-consciously
trying to draw attention to its use of transnational law. Not
surprisingly, then, these uses of transnational law received wide
attention in the popular press,29 and eventually even led the House of
Representatives to consider impeaching federal judges for
referencing transnational law.30 In terms of the life of the
26. See 539 U.S. at 558 (decided June 26, 2003); see, Supreme Court
Calendar October Term 2002, at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/
supremecourt/calendar/calendar.2002.html.
27. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing to
international conventions as reflecting "the international understanding of the
office of affirmative action").
28. See id. at 306 (decided June 23, 2003).
29. See, e.g., Tony H. Mauro, Court Shows Interest in International Law,
N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2003, at 1; H. Rubenstein, International Law's New
Importance In The US., NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 16; Quin Hillyer,
Constitutional Irrelevance, NAT'L REv., July 7, 2003, http://www
.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-hillyer07O7O3.asp; David A. Keene,
Justices: When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do, HILL, Jul. 15, 2003; Jacob
Levy, Foreign Invasion, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Nov. 12, 2003), at
https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=scholar&s=levyl 11203.
30. Representative Tom Feeney, a Republican from Florida, proposed a
resolution in the House of Representatives that "judicial determinations
regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should
not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions."
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H. Res. 568, at
http://www.house.gov/feeney/downloads/reaffinn/feeney008.pdf (May 7,
2004). Representative Feeney indicated in an interview that:
This resolution advises the courts that it is improper for them to
substitute foreign law for American law or the American
Constitution.... To the extent they deliberately ignore Congress'
admonishment, they are no longer engaging in 'good behavior' in the
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Constitution outside of the courts for persuasive authority, this was a
transnational law constitutional moment.
As a doctrinal matter, though, I question Professor Tushnet's
claim that Lawrence's use of transnational law was revolutionary.
Tushnet argues that this was the first time that a "recent Supreme
Court decision" 3' or "[t]he current Court[] ' '32 used transnational law
as a part of the majority opinion. However, in Atkins v. Virginia,
3 3
the 2002 case invalidating executions of mentally retarded criminals
for violating the Eighth Amendment, Justice John Paul Stevens
incorporated transnational law into part of the majority opinion.
34
Justice Stevens examined various sources and determined that there
was a consensus against the permissibility of such executions, and
that such executions therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.
35
One of these sources was transnational law:
Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative
judgment reflects a much broader social and professional
consensus. For example, several organizations with
germane expertise have adopted official positions opposing
the imposition of the death penalty upon a mentally retarded
offender. In addition, representatives of widely diverse
religious communities in the United States, reflecting
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist traditions, have
meaning of the Constitution and they may subject themselves to the
ultimate remedy, which would be impeachment.
Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, at
http://www.msnbc.com/id/4506232 (March 11, 2004) (statement of Rep. Tom
Feeney).
31. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241.
32. Id. at 244. Notice that these two statements are different (not
inconsistent, but different): Tushnet first remarks that "no recent ... decision"
has used transnational law as part of the analysis of the majority. Id. at 241
(emphasis added). Tushnet later states that this is the first time that the
"current Court" has done this. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). If recent means
the ten years since Justice Stephen Breyer joined the Court to make it "this"
Court, then these two statements mean exactly the same thing, but it is not
entirely clear that this is what Tushnet intends his statements to mean.
33. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
34. Id. at 316 n.21.
35. Id. at 307 (referencing "[t]he consensus reflected in... deliberations"
among a variety of institutions and sources as the reason for holding that
executing mentally retarded individuals violates "the Eighth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution").
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filed an amicus curiae brief explaining that even though
their views about the death penalty differ, they all "share a
conviction that the execution of persons with mental
retardation cannot be morally justified."
Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved. Brieffor
European Union as Amicus Curiae 4. Finally, polling data
shows a widespread consensus among Americans, even
those who support the death penalty, that executing the
mentally retarded is wrong. Although these factors are by
no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative
evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there
is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue. 
36
Granted, this language appears only in a footnote, but this footnote is
still part of the majority opinion, a majority opinion joined by five
other members of the Court in its entirety. Even Justice Scalia
writing in dissent took this language seriously, arguing with "the
Court's... [e]ffort to fabricate 'national consensus' [by looking to]
members of the so-called 'world community.
' ' 37
Depending on what Tushnet means by "recent," we can also find
many other examples of "recent" Supreme Court decisions
referencing transnational law in majority opinions. 38 In this past
term, in Schriro v. Summerlin,39 Justice Scalia referenced the
experience of foreign countries with judge trials as part of his
argument about the relative differences of judge versus jury trials,
40
and this reference was part of the majority opinion about the
importance of Ring v. Arizona41 for future parties.42 In the majority
opinion in Raines v. Byrd,43 the Court noted that other countries used
a standing system similar to one the Court was considering, making
36. Id. at 316 n.21 (emphasis added) (except as noted, citations omitted).
37. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
38. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004); Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997).
39. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
40. Id. at 2525.
41. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
42. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525.
43. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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such a system not totally irrational. 44 Transnational law has also been
referenced in less central parts of the U.S. Supreme Court opinions.4s
Another reason why, as a doctrinal matter, Lawrence was not
revolutionary: If we look beyond recent times, we can find
numerous examples of references to transnational law,46 often as part
44. Id. at 828.
45. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing "international views on [the] detention of refugees");
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (discussing the jurisprudence regarding freedom .of speech in the
European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court); Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (mentioning decisions of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court of
India, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the European Court of Human Rights,
the Canadian Supreme Court, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee
instructive); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (looking to the treatment of federalism issues in Switzerland,
Germany, and the European Union); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
785-87 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (examining the Dutch
experience with euthanasia); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Australian, Canadian, and
English legal regulations of campaign speech); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
906 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (examining the
relevant experiences of Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West
Germany, and Zimbabwe).
46. E.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (mentioning
judicial decisions discussing the right to life by the West German
Constitutional Court and the Canadian Supreme Court); Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 443 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (making reference to a state
court opinion referring to suspicionless searches as techniques used by
"Hitler's Berlin"); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (studying the experiences of other countries with "totalitarian
regimes"); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (examining race-conscious regimes in Nazi Germany and South
Africa); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality
opinion) (looking to the capital punishment practices of "nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and [of] the leading members of the Westem
European community"); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the
Nuremberg Tribunals); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)
(White, J., plurality opinion) (noting that "[it is... not irrelevant here that out
of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death
penalty for rape where death did not ensue"); Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416
U.S. 924, 926-27 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that American
constitutional protections for freedom of speech differentiate this country from
totalitarian countries); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
[Vol. 38:445
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of majority opinions issued by earlier Supreme Courts,47 even
94, 158 n.9 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing Brazil's "present
regime of censorship"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764-65 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (comparing the doctrinal approach of the majority
with that used by the "totalitarian countries"); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S.
889, 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (looking to
doctrinal trends "throughout the world"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (looking at "common understanding[s]
throughout the English-speaking world" regarding privacy); Irvin v. Dowd,
359 U.S. 394, 408 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (comparing American
judicial review with judicial review in other federal systems around the world);
Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959)
(recognizing the presence of federal maritime jurisdiction while noting that
"[s]uch a system is not an inherent requirement of a federal government");
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (discussing a "Poignant" argument for academic freedom in South
Africa); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing the role of freedom of speech in the constitutional order
in other democracies); Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 189 (1951) (Reed, J., dissenting) (studying the actions taken by other
democracies to "control disloyalty among government employees"); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1951) (Black, J., concurring) (noting the
use in Argentina of congressional investigations to attack dissident
newspapers); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (examining the standards of decency "in a civilized society");
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (arguing that "[t]he safeguards of 'due process of law' and the
'equal protection of the laws' summarize the history of freedom of English-
speaking peoples running back to Magna Carta and reflected in the
constitutional development of our people"); United States v. Allegheny
County, 322 U.S. 174, 198 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing
elements of Canadian federalism); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
304 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (upholding the ability of states to
regulate certain family law issues, despite different practices in foreign
systems); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (observing that the intergovernmental tax
immunity case before the Court raises the "same legal issues" as in Australia
and Canada under provisions of their constitutional acts).
47. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 507-08 n.6 (1990) ("[The]
courts might find guidance in. .. the opinions of South African tribunals, and
in the precedents of Nazi Germany.") (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 191-92 (1989)); Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("[T]he totalitarian state[s] in
our own times... have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of
the state."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982) (discussing
the experiences of England, India, Canada, and a "number of other
Commonwealth countries"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42
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sometimes opinions from more than half a century ago,48 and several
times as part of majority opinions in landmark cases. Consider two
wonderful examples. In Miranda v. Arizona,49 the Court devoted
several pages of the majority opinion to the analysis of lessons from
overseas regarding the warnings to be provided to potential criminal
(1977) (stating that "[t]he right of personal security is ... 'enshrined in the
history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples')
(quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)); Elrod v. Bums, 427
U.S. 347, 353 (1976) (observing that the Nazi patronage regime was associated
with the rise to power of the Nazi regime); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50
(1975) (finding that the phrase "crimes against nature" has been in use among
"English-speaking people" for many centuries); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
103 (1958) (pointing out that only two of eighty-four countries the Court
examined used "denationalization as a penalty for desertion"); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 167 (1955) (noting that prosecution rules regarding
contempt of Congress in the United States are "supported by long-standing
tradition here and in other English-speaking nations"); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (Frankfruter, J., concurring) (claiming that the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus is "one of the decisively differentiating
factors between our democracy and totalitarian governments").
48. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949) (noting the views "roif 10
jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of
Nations"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("The right to speak
freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the
chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes."); New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 n.5 (1946) (noting the barrenness of the
proprietary and governmental distinction in other federal systems for purposes
of intergovernmental tax immunity); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 234 (1945) (holding that domicile for constitutional purposes should be
treated as "an historic notion common to all English-speaking courts"); W. Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) ("rThe u]ltimate futility of
such attempts to compel coherence [of sentiment] is the lesson of every such
effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity .... the Inquisition...,
the Siberian exiles. .. , down to the fast failing efforts of our present
totalitarian enemies."); O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281 nn.6 & 8,
282 n.9 (1939) (examining the experience of other countries in determining
that the imposition of an income tax on judges' salaries was constitutional);
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (arguing that
constitutional protection should be extended only to "relatively fundamental
rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities")
(quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903))); Harriman v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 211 U.S. 407, 419 (1908) (stating that the power to
require testimony is usually limited "in English-speaking countries"); Thirty
Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) ("The
decisions of the Courts of every country... will be received, not as authority,
but with respect.").
49. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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suspects.5 In Roe v. Wade,5' Justice Blackmun looked to the
regulations of other countries regarding abortion.52
It is not so clear, then, that Lawrence was revolutionary, and
indeed it is not absolutely clear that Tushnet is right when he says
that "references to non-U.S. constitutional law have become more
frequent in recent years than they had been in decades from 1960 to
1990." 53 Instead, it would be more accurate to say we have had a
Court that has paid at least some attention to transnational law for a
long time, and many people are just now noticing.
54
B. Constitutional Interpretation and Transnational Law
As part of his general argument that the controversies about the
intersection of domestic and transnational law are not terribly
important, Tushnet claims that there is no unique debate about using
transnational law. Instead, he believes that:
[T]he real disagreement... [is] not about the relevance of
non-U.S. law to constitutional interpretation in general...
but [is] rather about the proper approach to interpreting the
U.S. Constitution .... 55
I have two concerns with this argument: First, I do not think there
are fundamental disagreements anymore about the relevance of
transnational law, so the core debate about its relevance that Tushnet
references simply does not exist. 56 Second, Justice Scalia and others
50. Id. at 436-40.
51. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Id. at 129-30.
53. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245.
54. This does not mean that the Court has cited to transnational law as
much as one might like, but it still means that transnational law has been a part
of the Court's agenda for some time, even though no one has noticed. See id.
at 239 ("[A]t least in the past, the U.S. Supreme Court paid attention to at least
some aspects of foreign constitutional law ....
55. Id. at 241-42.
56. To be fair, this statement is based to a good degree on several cases
decided after Tushnet finished writing his article. When Tushnet wrote his
piece, the language from Justice Scalia about transnational law, found in his
opinion in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004), was not yet
available, nor had Justice Scalia yet given his speech on transnational law to
the American Society of International Law. Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreign
Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address to the American
Society of International Law, (Apr. 2, 2004) in 98 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC.
305 (2004).
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have raised legitimate concerns-independent of general debates
about constitutional interpretation-about how precisely to use
transnational law.57 Although these concerns have been presented as
if they defeat the entire enterprise of using transnational law as an
interpretive tool, in reality we should read them as setting up the
debate about how exactly we are going to use transnational law.
First, everyone seems to agree that transnational law should be
used by American courts interpreting constitutional text,58 so
Tushnet is wrong in assuming that there is a debate about first
principles at all.59 Those generally considered to be "conservative[]"
have been identified as the most resistant to the use of transnational
law. 60 Conservative academics, although they testified in favor of
the Feeney Resolution when the House of Representatives
considered it,61 have conceded that transnational law can be used in
62 6many situations. Even Judge Richard Posner,63 for instance, has
argued in favor of the use of transnational law:
57. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241-42.
58. See infra notes 64-110 and accompanying text.
59. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245.
60. See, e.g., id. (identifying Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas as those who oppose the use of transnational law); see also Knight
v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (arguing that if "there [were] any [tradition or precedent] in our own
jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary" to look to transnational law); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) ("[C]omparative analysis [is]
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course
quite relevant to the task of writing one.").
61. Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of
American Law: Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 9 (2004)
(statement of Prof. John 0. McGinnis, Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ.)
[hereinafter McGinnis testimony], available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/mcginnis032504.pdf.; id. (statement of Prof. Jeremy Rabkin,
Professor of Law, Cornell Univ.) [hereinafter Rabkin testimony], available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/rabkin032504.htm; id. (statement of Prof.
Michael D. Ramsey, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Law School)
[hereinafter Ramsey testimony] (noting that Lawrence did not cite to countries
that did criminalize homosexual sodomy), available at http://www
.house.gov/judiciary/ramsey032504.pdf.
62. McGinnis testimony, supra note 61, at 5 ("[F]oreign law could be
relevant to prove a fact about the world which is relevant to the law."); Ramsey
testimony, supra note 61, at 1 ("Foreign materials are relevant to the
interpretation of U.S. law in numerous circumstances."). But see Rabkin
testimony, supra note 61 (noting strong objections to using transnational law);
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It was not irrelevant, from a pragmatic standpoint, to the
outcome of Brown v. Board of Education that official racial
segregation had been abolished outside the South and bore a
disturbing resemblance to Nazi racial laws .... If I were
writing an opinion invalidating the life sentence in my
hypothetical marijuana case I would look at the
punishments for this conduct in other states and in the
foreign countries, such as England and France, that we
consider in some sense our peers. If a law could be said to
be contrary to world public opinion I would consider this a
reason, not compelling but not negligible either, for
regarding a state law as unconstitutional even if the
Constitution's text had to be stretched a bit to cover it. The
study of other laws, or of world public opinion as
crystallized in foreign law and practices, is a more
profitable inquiry than trying to find some bit of eighteenth-
century evidence that maybe the framers of the Constitution
wanted courts to make sure punishments prescribed by
statute were proportional to the gravity, or difficulty of
apprehension, or profitability, or some other relevant
characteristic of the crime. If I found such evidence I would
think it a valuable bone to toss to a positivist or formalist
colleague but I would not be embarrassed by its absence
because I would not think myself duty-bound to maintain
consistency with past decisions.
64
More recently, Judge Posner has stated that "we already have our
own laws" and therefore do not need to examine transnational 
law.65
Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 425 ("In some areas, foreign and international law
is made relevant by our Constitution, by statute or treaty, by the well-
developed principles of common law, by overwhelming considerations of
comity, or simply by private commercial agreement of the parties. But when
judges, on their own motion and without any direction by Congress or the
Constitution decide to make such precedents relevant, we are dealing with an
entirely different question.").
63. I recognize that there are some problems with calling Judge Posner
"conservative," but I think it is fair to say that on most issues he is a
conservative, legally or politically.
64. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOzO L. REv. 1,
13-14 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
65. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2004, at 40.
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However, a closer reading of his argument indicates that Judge
Posner believes transnational law should be examined,66 even though
he believes it should not be considered any sort of "authority.' 6 7
Tushnet argues that four current Justices have used transnational
law in their opinions, and three have expressly criticized its
usage. 69 In fact, the Court is much more favorably inclined to use
transnational law than Tushnet recognizes. Justice Breyer is clearly
the leading proponent of using transnational law on the Court, and he
has referenced transnational law in many opinions,70 speeches,71 and
66. Id. at 42 ("I do not suggest that our iudges should ignore what people in
other nations think and do. Just as our states are laboratories for social
experiments from which other states and the federal government can learn, so
are foreign nations laboratories from whose legal experiments we can learn.").
67. Id. at 41 ("A decision by a higher court in the same judicial system...
is controlling.... No one supposes that foreign decisions have that kind of
authority.... It is quite something else to cite a decision by a foreign or
international court not as a precedent but merely because it contains persuasive
reasoning (a source or informational citation), just as one might cite a treatise
or a law review article because it was persuasive, not because it was
considered to have any force as precedent or any authority."). But see David
Fontana, Are We the World?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2004 (noting the
relationship between Judge Posner's writings on this issue).
68. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245 ("Four Justices-Stevens, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-have adverted to non-U.S. law in their opinions."); see
also Jackson, Yes Please, supra note 4, at 43 ("Of the current nine justices, at
least six--Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer-have
done so since 1992."). But see id. ("It is important not to exaggerate the
degree of controversy manifested on the Supreme Court.").
69. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245.
70. E.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing speech rights as they were discussed in
opinions issued by the European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian
Supreme Court); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mentioning decisions of the Privy
Council, the Supreme Court of India, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the
European Court of Human Rights, the Canadian Supreme Court, and the U.N.
Human Rights Committee); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (examining systems of federalism in Switzerland,
Germany, and the European Union).
71. E.g., Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address to the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 2-5, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265
(2003); Associate Justice Stephen J. Breyer, Liberty, Security and the Courts,
Remarks at the Association of the Bar of New York (April 14, 2003), available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html.
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articles. 72 Justice Ginsburg not only referenced transnational law in
Grutter,73 but also has done so in her speeches
74 and articles. 75
Justice O'Connor has referenced transnational law in at least one of
her opinions, 76 and recently has given a lecture77 and written articles
advocating reference to transnational law.78  Justice Stevens, the
author of the majority opinion that relied on transnational law in
Atkins,7 9 has used transnational law in other opinions as well. s °
Likewise, Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion that
relied on transnational law in Lawrence,81 has also referenced
72. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among Europe's
Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1045, 1060 (2000)
73. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (noting the "international understanding of the office of
affirmative action").
74. E.g., Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond the
Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, Remarks to the American Constitution Society (Aug. 2, 2003),
available at http://www.acslaw.org/video/conventionvideo.shtml.
75. See Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt,
Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 253, 281-82 (1999); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our
Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 329 (2004).
76. E.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the experiences of the
Nuremberg Tribunals).
77. Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks to the Southern
Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003), at http://
www.southerncenter.org/OConnortranscript.pdf. Right before this Reply was
to go to print, Justice O'Connor delivered a lecture on this subject at the
Georgetown University Law Center. See O'Connor Extols Role of
International Law (Oct. 27, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/
10/27/scotus.oconnor.ap.
78. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 20 ("I
think that American judges and lawyers can benefit from broadening our
horizons .... [We] will find ourselves looking more frequently to the
decisions of other constitutional courts."); Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See
Joint Issues with the E.U., WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24 (quoting Justice
O'Connor after meeting with ECJ Justices calling for more examination of
transnational law).
79. 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.21 (2002).
80. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (looking to foreign experiences "in totalitarian regimes").
81. 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003).
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transnational law in some of his other opinions.82 Justice Souter has
also referenced transnational law in several of his opinions.
83
What about the three Justices that Tushnet believes to be critics
of the use of transnational law?84 Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted
his strong approval of using transnational law,85 arguing that "it is
time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of
other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process."
86
He hardly sounds like a complete cynic.
What about Justice Scalia? Justice Scalia has been critical of the
use of transnational law in some of his opinions.87 In a speech in
April of 2004 to the American Society of International Law, Justice
Scalia maintained a generally hostile tone to the use of transnational
82. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the "international views on detention of refugees").
83. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785-87 (1997) (Souter,
J., concurring in the judgment) (examining Dutch euthanasia law).
84. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241-45.
85. As Vicki Jackson recounts:
Chief Justice William Rehnquist introduced a conference on
comparative constitutional law in 1999 by telling the story of how, a
decade before, the justices of Canada's Supreme Court said to him,
"We cite your Constitution; why don't you cite ours?" The chief
justice explained that at the time of that question, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was only seven years old. But time
had passed, he said, and by 1999 it was "less defensible to say that
we're not familiar with it." "It's time," he wrote, that "the U.S. courts
began looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in
their own deliberative process."
Jackson, Yes Please, supra note 4, at 43.
86. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks
(1989), reprinted in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE; A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof &
Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing decisions regarding the constitutional status of
right to life by the West German constitutional court and the Canadian
Supreme Court).
87. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national
consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the
views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of the so-
called 'world community."'); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. 11
(1997) ("[C]omparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing
one.").
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law.88 Still, while Justice Scalia does argue that transnational legal
materials are "hardly ever [relevant], 89 he has also argued that such
transnational materials may be helpful in determining if "a particular
holding will be disastrous." 90 Consequently, Justice Scalia believes
that this usage of transnational law does not mean that such materials
are to be used to determine the "meaning of' constitutional
provisions.
9 1
How does Justice Scalia's actual practice on the bench compare
with this jurisprudential position? Well, it seems that Justice Scalia
uses transnational materials far more than his speech has indicated.
In his dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma,92 Justice Scalia
did note that transnational law could be relevant. In Thompson, the
Court decided that "because [the defendant] was only 15 years old at
the time of his offense," 93 the Eighth Amendment prevented his
execution because strong sentiments gleaned from various sources
indicated that such an execution would be impermissible. 94 Writing
in dissent, Justice Scalia argued that:
The practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a
practice uniform among our people is not merely a
historical accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" that it occupies a place not merely in our
mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well.95
In other words, Justice Scalia viewed transnational law as relevant,
but relevant only in assessing whether a particular liberty interest fits
within any concept of what constitutes a fundamental right.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent in McIntyre v. Ohio
Election Commission,96 a case in which the Court decided whether
88. See Scalia, supra note 56.
89. Id. at 307.
90. Id. Although it is beyond the scope of this Reply, it is hard to see
how--once he admits that pragmatic consequences can sometimes be
relevant-Justice Scalia is able to say that pragmatic consequences can be
ignored the rest of the time.
91. Id.
92. 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 819.
94. Id. at 822-38.
95. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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an Ohio state law prohibiting anonymous campaigning was
constitutional. As part of his analysis in the dissenting opinion,
Justice Scalia noted that the Court had to examine whether this
prohibition actually improved democratic elections. 97 Justice Scalia
argued that:
We might also add to the list [of countries that have similar
restrictions] on the other side [from the majority] the
legislatures of foreign democracies: Australia, Canada, and
England, for example, all have prohibitions upon
anonymous campaigning. How is it, one must wonder, that
all of these elected legislators, from around the country and
around the world, could not see what six Justices of this
Court see so clearly that they are willing to require the
entire Nation to act upon it: that requiring identification of
the source of campaign literature does not improve the
quality of the campaign?
9 8
Two opinions from the 2002 Term further accentuate the point
that Justice Scalia seems to believe that transnational law can be
relevant at least some of the time. In Schriro v. Summerlin,99 the
Court had to decide whether the rule announced in Ring v.
Arizona, 100 requiring jury determination of certain factors necessary
for the death penalty,' 10 applied "retroactively to cases already final
on direct review." 10 2 Part of that determination involved examining
whether the rule announced by Ring was a "'watershed rule[] of
criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding."'
10 3
As part of his analysis in his majority opinion, 1° 4 Justice Scalia
noted that:
97. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 381-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
99. See 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
100. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
101. See id. at 603-09.
102. Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2521.
103. Id. at 2524 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
104. One could therefore also argue that the use of transnational law by
Justice Scalia was another example of the use of transnational law as part of
the holding of a majority opinion by the Supreme Court, just as Tushnet argues
was the case for the use of transnational law in Lawrence. Tushnet, supra note
6, at 241,244.
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[T]he mixed reception that the right to jury trial has
been given in other countries.., though irrelevant to the
meaning and continued existence of that right under our
Constitution, surely makes it implausible that judicial
factfinding so "seriously diminishes" accuracy as to
produce an "impermissibly large risk" of injustice. When
so many presumably reasonable minds continue to disagree
over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot
confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously
diminishes accuracy. 105
105. Shriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2525. Also examine Justice Scalia's remarks
during oral arguments in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), in which
Justice Ginsburg posed a transnational law question, and Justice Scalia seemed
to consider transnational law relevant:
QUESTION (Justice Ginsburg): General-we're part of a world, and
this problem is a global problem. Other countries operating under the
same equality norm have confronted it. Our neighbor to the north,
Canada, has, the European Union, South Africa, and they have all
approved this kind of, they call it positive discrimination. Do we-
they have rejected what you recited as the ills that follow from this.
Should we shut that from our view at all or should we consider what
judges in other places have said on this subject?
GENERAL OLSON: I submit, Justice Ginsburg that none of those
countries has our history, none of those countries has the Fourteenth
Amendment, none of those histories has the history of the statements
by this Court which has examined the question over and over again
that the ultimate damage that is done by racial preferences is such that
if there ever is a situation in which such factors must be used that they
must be-race neutral means must be used to accomplish those
objective, narrow tailoring must be applied, and this-this-these
programs fail all of those tests.
QUESTION (Justice Scalia): General Olson, do you know whether
any of those countries that Justice Ginsburg referred to that have gone
down the road of racial preferences, racial entitlements, have ever
gotten rid of racial preferences or racial entitlements?
GENERAL OLSON: There-
QUESTION (Justice Scalia): Has it been the road to ultimately a color
blind society or has it been the road to a society that has percentage
entitlements for the various races?
GENERAL OLSON: Sadly, I believe that this is correct.
Gratz, Record available at 2003 U.S. Trans LEXIS 27, at *23 (April 1, 2003);
see also Tushnet, supra note 6, at 260 n. 104 (quoting this exchange as well).
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Justice Scalia also referenced foreign law in his dissent in Locke v.
Davey10 6 as a way of noting the parade of horribles that might follow
if the logic of the majority opinion was taken to its extreme. 10 7 In
Lawrence, he cited the Canadian experience with same-sex marriage
in his dissent.1°8 While these may be examples of the "disastrous
consequences" exception to the bar against the use of transnational
law that Justice Scalia referenced in his speech, the other examples
just discussed, apart from Locke and Lawrence, are clearly not.
What do we make of these many arguments against the use of
transnational law by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia then,
given their strong opposition to the use of transnational law in other
situations? It seems fair to say that Justice Scalia and other
conservatives are not quite the critics of transnational law that
Tushnet assumes, although Justice Clarence Thomas may very well
be.' 09 There are two other related explanations, one principled and
one unprincipled. The unprincipled explanation, of course, is that
Justice Scalia in McIntyre, Summerlin and Locke simply used
transnational law because it helped his argument, and that there is no
principled reason why he disagreed with the use of transnational law
in Printz and Atkins. As Justice Scalia himself notes in a previous
essay that he wrote, "the trick is to look over the heads of the crowd
and pick out your friends.""
' 10
106. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
107. Id. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding is limited to
training the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of
directions to go. What next?... [R]ecall that France has proposed banning
religious attire from schools, invoking interests in secularism no less benign
than those the Court embraces today.").
108. 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) ("One of the benefits of leaving regulation of
this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike
judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion. The people may feel
that their disapprobation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow
homosexual marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual
acts-and may legislate accordingly. The Court today pretends that it
possesses a similar freedom of action, so that we need not fear judicial
imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada (in a
decision that the Canadian Government has chosen not to appeal).").
109. But see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (examining the experiences of Belgium, Cyprus,
Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe).
110. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 36 (1997) (quoting
Judge Harold Leventhal).
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A more interesting and perhaps more plausible explanation is
that Justice Scalia supports the use of transnational law but simply
has some concerns about how it may be used in specific contexts.
He may support the kind of analysis I mentioned in the
introduction-the next generation analysis that seeks to devise rules
and a system for using transnational law and the integrative
approach-rather than considering its usage entirely unproblematic
or problematic. Although this Reply is not the place to fully develop
these concerns voiced by Justice Scalia and his compatriots,"' they
are not entirely unreasonable concerns about the use of transnational
law in particular, nor are they, as Tushnet suggests, just debates
about constitutional interpretation in general.
For one thing, as Justice Scalia noted in Thompson, transnational
law should not be used before domestic law is examined." 12 In
Thompson, Justice Scalia admitted the potential relevance of
transnational law, but was also partly critical of its usage. 13 Justice
Scalia's mixed feelings about the use of transnational law in
Thompson stemmed from the fact that he seemed to believe that, for
a liberty interest to be very important, it needed to be generally
accepted by the American peoplefirst. Only then could one examine
whether it was somehow essential to any notion of liberty in the
abstract, which is the context in which transnational law would be
used. 114 This is a debate about the usages of transnational law as an
interpretive tool in particular-how important transnational law is
and where it fits within the hierarchy of interpretive sources.
Also, those who have occasionally indicated some hesitation
about the use of transnational law are concerned that transnational
law itself be used in a principled fashion. In his speech to the
American Society for International Law, Justice Scalia noted his
concerns about when the Court used transnational law, and which
countries and courts it referred to when citing such law.' As Judge
111. I have elsewhere addressed (and I hope rebutted) at least some of these
concerns. Fontana, supra note 14.
112. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
113. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that there must first be "a settled
consensus among our own people" before "the views of other nations" may be
imposed).
115. Scalia, supra note 56, at 309.
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Posner has argued, "the judicial systems of the rest of the world are
immensely varied and most of their decisions inaccessible, as a
practical matter, to our monolingual judges and law clerks."' 6 This
same concern was also voiced during the congressional hearings
about the Feeney resolution 117 and in Justice Scalia's speech to the
American Society of International Law."1
8
Again, this is not the debate that Tushnet is referencing:
Tushnet references a debate about the propriety of transnational law
ever being used, and a debate that is really just a charade, when the
real debate is about originalism. In contrast to this argument that the
debate is all about originalism, 119 this argument about selective use
of transnational materials is valid, serious, and independent of
concerns about originalism. It is also a debate more about how using
transnational law would work in practical operation.12
0
116. Posner, supra note 65, at 41.
117. Ramsey testimony, supra note 61, at 1-3.
118. Scalia, supra note 56, at 309 (noting problems with selectivity of Court
decisions as to when they use transnational law at all and what transnational
law they use).
119. This is not to deny that the debate about originalism is a central part of
the debate about transnational law. See generally id. There is just more to this
debate than traditional debates about constitutional interpretation.
120. Critics of the use of transnational law have made other objections that
seem to be determinative (i.e. not next generation debates), but these
objections are not ones that many take seriously. Judge Posner, for example,
recently commented:
This brings me to the third problem, which is the undemocratic
character of citing foreign decisions. Even decisions rendered by
judges in democratic countries, or by judges from those countries who
sit on international courts, are outside the U.S. democratic orbit. This
point is obscured because we think of our courts as "undemocratic"
institutions. But that is imprecise. Not only are most state judges
elected, but federal judges are appointed and confirmed by elected
officials, the president, and the members of the Senate. So our judges
have a certain democratic legitimacy. But the judges of foreign
countries, however democratic those countries may be, have no
democratic legitimacy here. The votes of foreign electorates are not
events in our democracy.
Posner, supra note 65, at 42. I address this argument in a work in progress, but
suffice it to say, it is hard to say how these concerns are fully valid.
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III. TRANSNATIONAL LAW As BINDING LAW
Tushnet next turns his attention to situations in which American
courts must use transnational law. Tushnet believes that objections
to these situations generally amount to a "tempest in a teapot."'1 21 He
does not address whether these objections are doctrinally valid, but
rather whether they are important as a matter of legal policy.
Tushnet first addresses federalism concerns, which he considers to be
unconvincing because he does not see any fundamental difference
between a system of litigation where transnational law is addressed
on the federal level and a system where it is addressed at other
levels.122 Tushnet argues that these federalism concerns are really
"conceal[ing]" more legitimate objections.123
Tushnet then turns to sovereignty-based concerns, which he
considers unimportant because he believes that any transnational
norms that are integrated into American law are integrated by
American decision makers. 124  This Part briefly addresses these
points, and shows how, on both points, Tushnet understates the
existence of valid concerns, but how there might be ways to address
those concerns and remain in the integrated system I referenced
earlier. While he does consider other issues that some may have
with the integrative project to be valid and therefore gives them
serious attention, 125 he does not consider the federalism and
sovereignty-based issues to be valid and consequently fails to give
them sufficient attention.
121. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 248.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 249.
125. Id. at 241 ("The important analytical concerns are not about sovereignty
but are rather about the substance of domestic constitutional law, and about the
separation of powers question of who gets to determine that substance."); id. at
257 (noting "a concern that making non-U.S. law a rule of decision would
generate bad law"). I found his discussion of both of these points to be quite
convincing, but I disagree with his contention that these are the more-or
only-legitimate objections to the integrative approach.
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A. Federalism
Tushnet discusses federalism concerns by first addressing the
debate about the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). 2 6 That statute
states that federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' 27 Some courts
have interpreted the ATCA to create a cause of action for individuals
to bring suit for actions that violate international law. 128 Led by
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, some have argued that the
ATCA was intended to create a cause of action for a very small
range of problematic conduct, 129 and for other cases the ATCA
simply provides for jurisdiction, leaving the cause of action to be
found elsewhere, most likely in state law.
130
Tushnet does not address whether these arguments are
doctrinally valid. Rather, he questions whether it makes any
difference if international law is understood as federal or state law.
As he sees it, in the instance of the ATCA, "any federal court
inclined to impose liability under the ATCA would find that the state
courts would do so as well."'131 In other words, whether under state
or federal law, the same set of legal actions would proceed forward.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see Tushnet, supra note 6, at 246-48.
Tushnet does not see the difference between calling the statute the Alien Tort
Claims Act or the Alien Tort Act:
I have discovered that there is a bizarre-and to me totally pointless-
controversy over how to refer to this statute. Apparently, human
rights advocates call it the Alien Tort Claims Act, while their
opponents call it the Alien Tort Act. That people actually think
anything turns on the label shows how odd these discussions are.
Id., at 246 n.38. In fact, though, calling the statute the Alien Tort Claims Act
makes it sound like the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-
2680 (2000), a statute that clearly does create a cause of action. So, the
difference in phrasing is at least rhetorically-if not really doctrinally or
prudentially-important.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
128. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238, 246 (2d Cir. 1995);
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11 th Cir. 1996).
129. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article 11I, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 587 (2002).
130. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 815, 870 (1997).
131. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 248.
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Tushnet views the only significant difference to be that "Congress
can displace the cause of action"'132 if the cause of action is supplied
by federal law, "while under the alternative[,] state legislatures
could."'
1 33
At a very general level, it is difficult to imagine that state
legislatures and Congress (or elected state judges and Article III
federal judges) would treat international law in precisely the same
way as one another. We know of some examples of state activity
related to foreign affairs, such as the many city and state provisions
restricting interactions with apartheid South Africa, 3 4 the anti-
Burma law from Massachusetts that the Court recently considered,
35
and the Holocaust law from California that the Court addressed last
term.' 36 A state may pass a law protecting one particular industry of
great importance to it and may hold parties liable for ATCA suits, for
instance, while Congress would be less likely to pass such a law. 1
37
At a practical level, this concern about whether the cause of
action comes from federal or state law has a variety of important
implications. For instance, some circuit courts have attributed a ten-
year statute of limitations to non-state-law claims brought under the
ATCA by analogizing it to a similar federal statute. 138  If ATCA
cases were litigated pursuant to state law, however, then state statutes
of limitations would apply, 139 and these would be much shorter than
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Peter Fitzgerald, Massachusetts, Burma, and the World Trade
Organization: A Commentary on Blacklisting, Federalism, and Internet
Advocacy in the Global Trading Era, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (2001).
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (1997), held unconstitutional, by
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
136. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
137. Of course, the federal government sometimes passes laws that protect a
narrow industry as well.
138. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. 102-256,
§ 2(c), 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350). For judicial
decisions applying the TVPA statute of limitations to ATCA cases, see Papa v.
United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002) and Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293,
at *61-*62 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002).
139. Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *63.
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under the current ATCA rule. 140 There would also be differences in
the amount and nature of damages available and applicable rules
related to the exhaustion of remedies.' 41 So, in addition to possibly
different instances under which cases would go forward if the
federalism-based concerns were taken seriously, the particular nature
of these actions would differ as well.
Tushnet then turns to the argument that customary international
law should not be considered part of the "Laws of the United States"
mentioned in Article VI of the Constitution, 142 but instead that
"[c]ustomary international law is the law of New York, Iowa, and
Texas." 143 As Tushnet sees it, this question only makes a difference
when three conditions are met:
(1) the judge (probably a federal judge, acting under the
alienage, diversity, or federal question jurisdiction) would
not find the conduct at issue to violate purely domestic law;
(2) the judge would find the conduct to violate customary
international law; and (3) if customary international law is
federal law, Congress would not displace the judge's
holding whereas some state legislatures would.
144
It is plausible that state law might not apply in some instances where
federal law might, such as when the conduct at issue relates to
actions that took place overseas. Once again, in such cases state
legislatures and Congress would certainly act differently with respect
to international law, so Tushnet's third condition might be met often,
despite his assurance that "[t]he real-world cases satisfying these
[three] conditions appear to be a nearly empty set.'
' 45
140. Id. at *61 (discussing the significant hardships for plaintiffs in the
"[a]pplication of the shorter statutes of limitations available under [state]
laws").
141. The ATCA, for example, has a provision for damages and exhaustion of
remedies that may very well differ from state law provisions governing like
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a)(2) (b).
142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
143. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 249. Tushnet argues that "treaties are
supreme under the Supremacy Clause," and that since "[i]nternational law does
not distinguish between customary international law and treaty-based law,"
then domestic law should not either. Id at 248. But this is a major logical leap,
one that requires more elaboration than Tushnet provides.
144. Id. at 250 (internal citations omitted).
145. Id.
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At a broader level, Tushnet does not seem to recognize the
important role that states play in enforcing transnational law, and
therefore why it is important to ensure that they not be entirely
displaced. We want to make sure that states play an active role in
transnational law for reasons that Tushnet ignores. We have
benefited substantially from the active role that states have played in
implementing many private international law conventions 146 and
international trade agreements. 147 Each state has been able to enforce
these international rules in the best manner possible given local
conditions, while still maintaining a degree of uniformity. In the
context of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), for instance,
innovative state regulatory schemes regarding government
procurement have been entirely displaced by new international
regimes. 148 It is this concern that caused the North Dakota Attorney
General to remark that "'NAFTA and other trade agreements present
the greatest challenge to state sovereignty that we have."' 149 Because
states are closer to citizens than is the federal government, they are
also able to enforce norms of international law in a more
democratically legitimate manner. Tushnet ignores these virtues
when he argues that it is unimportant how transnational litigation
should proceed forward.
146. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 601-03 (1995) (describing structure and
purpose of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws).
147. See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A)
(2000) (barring anyone other than the United States from challenging U.S. or
state action or inaction based on its consistency with the Uruguay Round
Agreements); URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H. R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 675-77, 1043-44
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4054-56, 4327.
148. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, adopted Dec. 15, 1993, pt. II, Annex 4(b): Agreement on
Government Procurement, 31 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND 25, 679-705 (1994).
149. Evelyn Iritani, TRADE PACTS ACCUSED OF SUBVERTING U.S. POLICIES,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al (quoting Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General,
North Dakota).
473
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It is also important that we make sure that some uniformity
exists in how the United States interacts with other countries.50 As it
stands now, true international law litigation has been so
infrequent' 5 '-and limited mostly to very severe cases' 52- th a t it has
infringed on the prerogatives of states in only a very limited manner.
Still, we want to devise a system that balances the need for
uniformity with the need for maintaining a vital role for states, and
this division should now be our focus. Perhaps we might want to
expand the role of state governments in national litigation involving
the meaning of international law, much as the German Ldinder have a
major role in the interactions between their national government and
the European Union. 153 Perhaps some formulations of how norms of
international law apply to states should be given a "margin of
appreciation," so that each state can determine-within a range-
how to apply a particular norm. 154 There are many ways we can
address federalism concerns and still benefit from international law
litigation in our courts; the important point is that we should start
trying now.
B. Sovereignty
Tushnet also turns to the concerns that others have that the
integration of transnational law into domestic law may infringe on
150. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the importance of uniformity in
implementing national laws).
151. See David J. Bederman, International Law Advocacy and Its
Discontents, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 475, 480 n.17 (2001) ("In an admittedly
imperfect empirical exercise, I calculate that since 1980 there have been
approximately ninety-five reported decisions involving a substantial issue
implicating the ATS.").
152. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(allowing Argentine citizens residing in the United States to bring an action
against a former Argentine general for torture, murder, and prolonged arbitrary
detention).
153. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of
Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 242-43
(Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
154. Gerald Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony
and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1871-72 (2003).
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American sovereignty.155 As Tushnet sees it, these concerns are not
as significant as others claim because:
[D]omestic law-making institutions retain the power to
override nearly all international obligations. They can
withdraw from a treaty, violate a treaty for purposes of
domestic law while accepting the consequences of the
violation on the international level, and-most relevant to
customary international law but applicable as well to treaty
obligations--can enact a statute inconsistent with
international law that, prior to the statute, was domestically
applicable, thereby displacing the international rule with a
domestic one under the "last in time" principle. 1
56
In other words, since American institutions are the institutions that
give practical effect to international rules, there are no serious
sovereignty concerns.1
5 7
Tushnet illustrates his argument with reference to several
specific examples. First, he notes that in the case of the application
of customary international law in American federal or state courts,
"domestic law-making institutions retain the power to override
nearly all international obligations.' ' 5 8 Tushnet also references the
WTO and the dispute resolution procedure that it uses to determine
whether the laws of a particular nation-state violate international
law. 159  Tushnet argues that "[f]ormally speaking, the dispute
resolution mechanism does not in itself make the WTO's treaty
interpretations controlling in domestic disputes."' 160 Tushnet also
makes this argument in the context of NAFTA, which provides the
basis for free trade violation lawsuits against the United States.
161
Tushnet argues that, although a finding of a NAFTA violation "is
155. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 257, 260-67.
156. Id. at 249-50.
157. Id. at 253 ("It is harder than one might think to formulate the precise
constitutional [sovereignty] objection .... "); id. at 255 (discussing how
sovereignty arguments "seem to be even weaker than the federalism-based
objections"); id. at 256 ("[T]he objections are constitutionally creative. It is
not that they are frivolous in some strong sense. Instead, they are at odds with
rather long-standing understandings of constitutional law and working them
out in detail can create some pretty peculiar doctrinal structures.").
158. Id. at 249.
159. Id. at252.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 252-54.
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very likely to generate a response by Congress preempting the state
[or federal] law,"' 62 Congress or the relevant state legislature itself
makes the final decision and is not obligated to enforce the decision
issued pursuant to a finding of a NAFTA violation.' 
63
Several issues arise from the notion that there are no problems
with the integrative approach because American institutions retain
ultimate control. First of all, domestic institutions must follow an
increasing number of transnational legal rules regardless of whether
they have consented to implement such obligations. These rules-
often calledjus cogens or peremptory norms-are said to be binding
regardless of what a state does. 164 Thus, if a state indicates through
its institutions that it disagrees with these transnational norms, it
breaks the law, rather than indicating its decision to opt out of this
law. 1
65
In reality, these peremptory norms still apply only to a very
small range of conduct, and it would be practically impossible for an
American individual to be subjected to these norms in the absence of
actions of an American institution. Still, these norms have had some
impact, such as in the movement to prosecute Henry Kissinger for
crimes against humanity. 166 Kissinger fled Paris to avoid being
forced to address a warrant commanding his testimony in a French
case. 16 7 He did the same to avoid French and Chilean judges in
England. 168 No act of Congress, no executive order, and no federal
regulation had functionally implemented the peremptory norms that
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334, 347, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-
99, 703; Siderman v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. k & reporters' note 6 (1987).
165. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884
n.15 (2d Cir. 1980).
166. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER (2001);
Christopher Hitchens, The Case Against Henry Kissinger, HARPER'S MAG.,
Feb. 2001, http://www.icai-online.org/files/hitchens-harpers-kissinger.pdf.
167. Christopher Hitchens, The Latest Kissinger Outrage, SLATE (Nov. 27,
2002), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2074678.
168. Jonathan Franklin & Duncan Campbell, Kissinger May Face
Extradition to Chile, GUARDIAN, June 12, 2002, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/
intemational/story/0,3604,735723,00.html.
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caused the lawsuits in these countries, yet Kissinger still had cause to
be concerned.
Of course, in most instances a domestic institution will be
required to act to effectuate transnational law on American soil.
Surprisingly, Tushnet, though one of the most influential anti-
formalists of the past generation, argues that the technical, formal
control that domestic institutions maintain in creating and bringing
into effect transnational law is sufficient to alleviate any potential
concerns. 169  However, delegating authority to transnational
institutions might be a cause for concern in the same way that
delegating authority to administrative institutions might. Both acts of
delegation encourage directly accountable branches of government to
avoid meaningful accountability by enacting vague statutes that
enable other (domestic or international) institutions to act. While
American branches of government still maintain technical control
over the implementation of international rules, allowing them to
delegate great amounts of authority allows them to play a very
minimal role.
Tushnet considers the constitutional merits of this form of
argument to be dubious, 170 but surely that is an overstatement. The
Constitution does seem to encourage-if not require-elected
officials to take responsibility for public policy. The Appointments
Clause requires the president to take responsibility for the execution
of laws.' 71 The decision to grant Congress the sole power to legislate
makes Congress accountable for legislative action. 172 When
American institutions grant transnational institutions significant
powers, usually done through an enabling act, the American
institutions proceed to act quite infrequently and in a perfunctory
169. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 249, 253-57, 263.
170. Id. at 253-54.
171. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). For a discussion of this Clause in the context of international
delegations, see Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1563 (2003);
Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 107-
10 (2000); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 120-29 (1998).
172. U.S. CONST. art. I.
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manner to oversee and implement the actions of these transnational
institutions.
Any initial enabling act that provides for the relevance of
transnational law-which Tushnet considers to be so central-can
often be in many ways a small and meaningless legislative activity.
In the United States, the executive branch normally must receive
congressional assent before it can begin trade discussions, and then
any product that results from these discussions must be submitted to
Congress for its approval. 173  However, Congress may waive its
power to amend the submitted proposal and its power to use
supermajority voting in the Senate. 174 In the context of the WTO,
Tushnet's example of a harmless delegation, the United States
negotiated and then consented to the WTO solely using the fast track
procedure. 175  Congress can either vote yes or no on a trade
agreement using this procedure, but cannot negotiate any details of
the agreement or even seriously debate the agreement. 1
76
How does the WTO work in practice? In 1994, the Uruguay
Round Agreements created a standing Appellate Body to review the
work of the WTO. 17 7 The General Council of WTO members can
overrule this Appellate Body, but only by a supermajority vote or
consensus, 178 and thus a decision by the Appellate Body usually
results in a final decision by the WTO. In 1993, the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), acting pursuant to authority granted by
the Clean Air Act, issued a regulation defining how dirty gasoline
was permitted to be.' 79 This regulation required the domestic
refineries only to ensure that their gasoline did not fall below the
173. Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, Addressing Environmental
Concerns Regarding Chilean Accession to NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 221,
229 (1995).
174. Id.
175. See Harold Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 163 (1992).
176. Id. at 161 n.47.
177. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uraguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, adopted Dec. 15, 1993, pt. II, Annex 2: Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, para. 17.1, 33
I.L.M. 112, 123 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
178. Id.
179. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1998) (promulgated
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8) (1994)).
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lowest of three firm- or industry-specific baselines. 1  By contrast,
the regulation required importers of foreign gasoline to follow a
more demanding standard. 181  Venezuela objected to the EPA
standard, and used the WTO dispute resolution procedure to
challenge this standard. 182 The WTO Appellate Body agreed with
Venezuela that the EPA regulation was not justifiable under Article
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.'
8 3
Following Tushnet's theory, there should be no policy concerns
with this WTO ruling because an American institution would have to
decide whether to enforce this WTO ruling; otherwise, it would just
be words on paper, with no practical significance. However, the
WTO gained its initial authority to decide the Venezuela case
because the American government had consented to an agreement
prohibiting the very vague act of "unjustifiable discrimination."',
84
This is hardly an example of a directly accountable democratic
branch deliberating and clearly deciding upon the proper course of
policy and legal standard.
Furthermore, American institutions did have to consider the
WTO ruling in order to make it effective, and this particular WTO
decision generated as much rhetoric as almost any decision by a non-
American tribunal. The discussion of this issue, however, was
comparatively brief, and many of the technical and other details were
settled by the WTO decision. The American government acted, but
with background facts already established. As Justice White noted in
his dissent in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
185
administrative agencies make the overwhelming amount of federal
administrative law, and when Congress acts with respect to an
administrative activity, it acts with many of the facts and context
180. Id. § 80.91(a).
181. Id. § 80.91(b)(4).
182. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNITED STATES-STANDARDS FOR
REFORMULATED AND CONVENTIONAL GASOLINE: REPORT OF THE PANEL, No.
WT/DS2R (1996).
183. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNITED STATES-STANDARDS FOR
REFORMULATED AND CONVENTIONAL GASOLINE: REPORT OF THE APPELLATE
BODY, No. AB-1996-1, at 29 (1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603, 633.
184. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XX, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
185. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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already established by the administrative agencies.' 86 Of course,
administrative agencies can often act with direct effects on American
citizens, while international institutions cannot, but in both cases if
Congress does act, it only need act in a very brief and incomplete
fashion.
What should we make of these transnational institutions to
which Tushnet has no problems granting power? We might have
less of a problem with their authority if they were themselves
democratic, but, in fact, international bodies tend to make rules
according to the wishes of the executive branches of member states.
International institutions are at least as likely as domestic regulatory
institutions to be subject to regulatory capture by a few powerful
interests. Domestic regulatory agencies also exercise substantial
authority and, as an empirical matter, cause popularly elected
branches of government to make fewer important decisions. Besides
the fact that they are still more likely to be democratically
accountable via the Appointments Power or mere geographical and
social proximity to democratic interests, though, there are cultural
differences between the two situations. Individuals exercising
authority in transnational institutions come from different
backgrounds, and have a different set of cultural norms and
assumptions, for example, than do American officials. So, to go
back to a debate that Professor Tushnet himself quotes in his
piece, 187 someone from Chile will have a different cultural frame of
reference than someone from Alabama. In a world in which, as a
practical matter, that individual from Chile will be exercising a
substantial degree of daily power even if an American institution has
the ultimate, formal power over that individual, this might be of
concern.
Still, despite the fact that these sovereignty concerns have
substantial validity, this does not mean that it is time to abandon the
integrative project. Delegating some authority to international
institutions can reduce the costs of making decisions because these
186. Id. at 985-86.
187. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 267 n.130 (quoting an e-mail from me stating
that "a New Yorker might have problems with someone from Connecticut
telling them or her what to do, but would have more difficulty with someone
from Alabama doing so, and even more difficulty with someone from Chile
doing so.")
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institutions have some institutional advantages over American
legislatures. Not surprisingly, then, the open markets created by
institutions like the WTO have been responsible for substantial
amounts of economic growth. The human rights litigation that has
gone forward because of the recognition of certain fundamental
norms has been at least partly responsible for disposing brutal leaders
such as Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor.' 88 There are clear
benefits to recognizing strong rules of international law that states
generally cannot avoid.
However, if we are going to follow this system, it is time to
focus on how to make these transnational institutions more
democratically accountable to American and other citizenries-both
internally and externally-so as to avoid any concerns that these
institutions might go forward with very little consent from domestic
populations. Perhaps we should seriously reconsider rules that force
Congress to lay down stronger "intelligible principle[s]' ' 89 when it
makes international agreements, or that force Congress to seriously
and soberly consider a transnational ruling before it gives such a
ruling domestic effect.' 
90
Perhaps Congress should exercise some version of its
Appointment Power when important officials are being considered
for high-level positions in international organizations. As an
example, consider the variation in the procedure used to select
adjudicative panels in WTO disputes versus NAFTA disputes. In the
WTO, panelists are chosen by the WTO itself, and no member state
can oppose their selection except for "compelling reasons."191 For
188. See generally Aryeh Neier, Accountability for State Crimes: The Past
Twenty Years and the Next Twenty Years, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 351
(2003).
189. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928) (setting an "intelligible principle" as the litmus test for a congressional
delegation's constitutionality). But see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 430 (1935) (noting the absence of an "intelligible principle" for one of the
only two times ever) (internal citation omitted); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (representing the other
instance).
190. See, e.g., S. 16, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Dole proposed the creation
of a domestic appellate body that would consider WTO rulings before they
could become domestically effective.
191. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 177, art. 8.6, 33 I.L.M. at
119.
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NAFTA adjudications, however, the parties themselves select the
panelists, and if they cannot agree on such panelists they choose
panel members by lottery. 1
92
We might also begin to consider means of opening up
international institutions to participation by American citizens. Right
now, dispute settlement proceedings in the WTO are closed to the
public,193 information about the members of the adjudicatory panels
are secret, 194 and NGOs and other institutions and individuals may
not observe sessions of the legislative body of the WTO. 195 Again,
changing these rules might be a way of opening up these
international institutions to public input, which would be a way of
remedying any sovereignty concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
The globalization of American law is an inevitable by-product
of the way our world is changing. In Canada, for instance, in nearly
half of all cases decided between 1984 and 1995, judges cited to a
foreign case, and in one out of three cases, judges cited to an
American case. 19 6 Closer to home, our judges regularly use their
summer vacations to meet with foreign judges and discuss shared
legal issues, and during the year they meet at law schools such as
Yale and New York University. 197 It seems that it is just a matter of
time before our law becomes significantly more globalized.
192. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 2011.1, 107
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289.
193. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 177, art. 14, 33
I.L.M. at 122.
194. Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 331, 333 n.15
(1996) ("Unfortunately, the biographies of trade dispute panelists.., are
unavailable.").
195. See id. at 334.
196. C.L. Ostberg et al., Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change:
Explaining the Citations of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of
Canada, 34 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 377, 386 (2001).
197. For a recent example of the books that Yale Global Constitutionalism
Seminar for Judges creates, see PAUL GEwiRTz, GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM: TERRORISM: DETENTION, JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES;
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; COMMERCIAL SPEECH, INTERNET JURISDICTION;
THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION (2003).
Fall 2004] TRANSNAT'L/DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 483
This is certainly a good thing. As we learn more about how
other countries handle situations, it will expand the range of
possibilities we consider in our law. It will increase our
understanding of these countries and hence improve our relationships
with them. Moreover, entering into joint agreements with these
countries has proven to increase cooperation, comity, and as a result,
economic growth and protection of human rights.
Despite these virtues and Tushnet's defense of parts of the
system that have led to these virtues, we should not delude ourselves
into thinking that these arrangements do not have their own unique
and substantial problems. The solution is not to give up on the
globalization project; rather, it is time for us to stop debating the
merits of this project and to think about how to make it work best.
Now is the time to start with this project.
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